## INTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT FORTHEEASTERNDISTRICTOFPENNSYLVANIA

CHARLESJ.GREENLEAF,JR.,	
AlternativeExecutoroftheEstateof	CIVILACTION
CHARLESJ.GREENLEAF,SR.,Deceased	
andNAOMIGREENLEAF,inherown	No.90-1557
right,	
Plaintiffs,	
v.	
GARLOCK,INC.,etal.,	
Defendants	

## <u>ORDERANDMEMORANDUM</u>

ANDNOW, thisdayof,1997,uponconsiderationofPlaintiffs'

MotionforDamagesforDelayPursuanttoCivilRuleofProcedure238,asamendedNovember

7,1988,andtheresponsesthereto,itishereby ORDEREDthatthesaidmotionis GRANTED.

The Courthere by awards damage sunder Pa.R. Civ. P. 238 in the amount of \$135, 433.22.

Rule238isconsideredsubstantivefor Eriepurposes. Kirkv.RaymarkIndustries,

Inc.,61F.3d147,168(3dCir.1995); Fauberv.KemTransport&EquipmentCo., 876F.2d327,

328(3dCir.1989).Rule238(a)(2)(ii)statesthatdamagesfordelayshallbeawarded"inan

actioncommencedonorafterAugust1,1989,fromadateoneyearafterthedateoriginalprocess

wasfirstservedintheactionuptothedateoftheaward,verdict,ordecision."Owens-Corning

wasservedwithacopyofComplaintonMarch14,1990,andGarlock,Inc.wasservedwitha

copyoftheComplaintonMarch19,1990. SeeDef.OwensCorningResp.toPlaintiffs'Motion

forDamagesforDelay,Ex.A;Def.GarlockResp.toPlaintiffs'MotionforDelayDamages,Ex.

A.OnJuly23,1997,thejuryreturnedaverdictinthedamagesphaseofthetrialof\$1,850,000:

July25,1997,thejuryreturnedaverdictintheliabilityphaseofthetrialfindingOwens-Corning andGarlock,Inc.liable,andjudgmentwasenteredagainstthesedefendants.Theapplicabletotal is\$250,000,andthepotentialperiodofdelaydamagesrunsfromMarch14,1991toJuly25, 1997fordefendantsOwensCorningandGarlock. SeePa.R.Civ.P.Rule238(a)(ii).Rule

<sup>1</sup>On

See

238 (b) provides that delay damages shall exclude the period of time after which the defendant of the period of

has made a written of fer of settlement or during which the plaint if feaused delay of the trial.

\$250,000fortheEstateofCharlesJ.Greenleaf,Sr.and\$1,600,000toNaomiGreenleaf.

Pa.R.Civ.P.238(b)(1)-(2).Defendantsmadenowrittenofferofsettlement.

Damagesfordelayshallbecalculatedattherate"equaltotheprimerateaslisted inthefirsteditionoftheWallStreetJournalpublishedforeachcalendaryearforwhichthe damagesareawarded,plusonepercent,notcompounded."Pa.R.Civ.P.238(a)(3).

<sup>1.</sup>Delaydamagesarenotavailableforalossofconsortiumclaim,andplaintiffshavenot requesteddelaydamagesforthisaspectofthejuryaward. See Anchorstarv.MackTrucks,Inc., 620A.2d1120,1121-22(Pa.1993).

<sup>2.</sup>OwensCorningassertsthatplaintiffshavedelayedtrialfornotreinstatingthecaseafterJudge WeinerdismissedanumberofcaseswithoutprejudiceonOctober15,1993,pendingthecases meetingtherequirementsof <a href="Giffearv.Johns-MansvilleCorp.">Giffearv.Johns-MansvilleCorp.</a>, 632A.2d880(Pa.Super.1994), <a href="aff'dsubnom.Simmonsv.Pacor,Inc.">aff'dsubnom.Simmonsv.Pacor,Inc.</a>, 674A.2d232(Pa.1996)(holdingpleuralthickening absentdisablingconsequencesisnotacognizableclaim). This casewas scheduled for a settlement conference on May 16, 1995 after petition from counsel, and the casewas reinstated as active on June 12, 1997. Def. Owens Corning's Resp., Exs. C, D. Delay caused by the judicial process does not affect the calculation of delay damages. See Kirk, 61F.3dat 170.

Owens Corning's reliance on <a href="Babichv.Pittsburgh&NewEnglandTruckingCo.">Babichv.Pittsburgh&NewEnglandTruckingCo.</a>, 563A.2d168 (Pa. Super. 1989) is misplaced, given the unique nature of as best os litigation in this District. <a href="Ecf.Kirk,61F.3dat169">Cf.Kirk,61F.3dat169</a> (failure to request a remandand failure to pursue exclusive state court litigation did not constitute delay by plaintiffs and should not preclude an award of delay damages).

## Thedamagesfordelayarecomputedasfollows:

1.3/14/91to12/31/91(287daysat103/4%),\$26,875x287/365:	3	\$21,131.85
2.1/1/92to12/31/92(1yearat7½%):		18,750.00
3.1/1/93to12/31/93(1yearat7%):		17,500.00
4.1/1/94to12/31/94(1yearat7%):		17,500.00
5.1/1/95to12/31/95(1yearat9½%):		23,750.00
6.1/1/96to12/31/96(1yearat9½%):		23,750.00
7.1/1/97to7/25/97(206daysat91/4%),\$23,125x206/365:	4	13,051.37

Total: \$135,433.22

## **BYTHECOURT:**

MARVINKATZ,J.

<sup>3.</sup> Theapplicablepercentagerangefor 1991 is 91/2% to 10% See Addendum to Explanatory Comment to Pa.R. Civ. P. 238 (Supp. 1997). Plaintiff has used the 11% figure, while defendants Garlock and Owens Corning have asserted that the 101/2% figure applies. The court has applied the average of the two, or 103/4%. See, e.g., Cahoev. Johnson, Civ. A. No. 90-7430, 1992 WL 204398, at 2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1992). The court also notes that plaintiff shave misconstrued 238(a)(2)(ii) by be ginning their calculations from the date of the filling of the complaint rather than from the date of service of process on defendants. See Def. Owens Corning Resp. to Plaintiff's Motion for Damages for Delay, Ex. A; Def. Garlock's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Delay Damages, Ex. A.

<sup>4.</sup>Plaintiffshaveassertedthata91/2% figureshouldbeused, but defendants Owens Corning and Garlock claims that an 91/4% figureshould beused, and the courtagrees with the defendants. See Addendum to Explanatory Comment to Pa.R. Civ. P. 238.